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Cryptosporidiosis Action Plan for Maryland


Introduction:

Cryptosporidium parvum, a protozoan parasite, is found in the feces of infected people, cattle, and other domestic animals. It has been a recognized human pathogen since 1976. It affects people with HIV infection and other immunosuppressed persons more severely than the general population. It has been identified as a cause of sporadic human gastrointestinal disease and sometimes of outbreaks - the largest being the 1993 waterborne outbreak in Milwaukee in which more than 400,000 persons became ill. It has also been transmitted by person-to-person contact in child care setting, through food, and through sexual activity that involve contact with feces.

Cryptosporidiosis has become a significant public health issue, particularly because studies indicate that Cryptosporidium oocysts are present in 65%-97% of surface water prior to treatment (i.e., rivers, lakes, and streams) tested throughout the U.S. Because Cryptosporidium is highly resistant to chemical disinfectants used to treat drinking water, physical removal of the parasite from water by filtration is an important component of the municipal water treatment process.

Conventional water filtration should trap nearly all protozoan parasites, including Giardia and Cryptosporidium, if the water is properly processed with adequate equipment and optimal procedures (coagulation-flocculation) are conducted by well-trained operators. However, a small number of Cryptosporidium oocysts may occasionally get through the treatment process to the finished drinking water.

Reports of Cryptosporidium oocysts in treated municipal water that was meeting U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) turbidity standards indicate small numbers of oocysts breached water treatment filters in 27%-54% of the communities evaluated . The health risk associated with drinking filtered tap water contaminated with small numbers of C. parvum oocysts is unknown. More general information on the organism, transmission, and prevention are found in Attachment 1.

The EPA has promulgated a plan to collect data concerning the occurrence of several pathogens and chemicals in water and the ability of water treatment plants to remove these substances. The plan, known as the Information Collection Rule (ICR), was published in the May 14, 1996 Federal Register. This Rule applies to large water systems serving at least 100,000 people and using surface water or groundwater influenced by surface water (these systems will test for certain microbial and chemical parameters), and groundwater systems which serve at least 50,000 people (these systems will only test for chemical parameters).

A total of three water systems in Maryland is impacted by ICR requirements. One system is using groundwater and is required to monitor for disinfection byproducts. The other two are surface water systems and are required to monitor for both microbial and chemical parameters.

The microbial testing requirements include monitoring source water for Cryptosporidium, Giardia, viruses, total coliforms, and fecal coliforms. If levels of Cryptosporidium or Giardia in source water exceed 10 organisms per liter of water, or if one or more total culturable viruses in one liter of water are recovered, then the treated water leaving the plant must also be monitored for these organisms.

ICR monitoring began in July 1997, and will continue for 18 months. Utilities will report data to EPA on a monthly basis and will have four months from the time of sampling to conduct the analyses and submit the data. EPA will then validate the data and make these results available to the public. More information on the ICR can be found in Attachments 2A, 2B and 2C.

In September 1994, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Center for Infectious Diseases convened a workshop entitled "Prevention and Control of Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis: An Emerging Public Health Threat." The purpose of the workshop was to discuss ways to minimize the public health risks associated with waterborne cryptosporidiosis by addressing four key issues:

  • surveillance and epidemiological study designs
  • public health responses when oocysts are detected in drinking water
  • cryptosporidiosis in immunocompromised persons; and
  • water sampling methods, interpretation of data, and laboratory research priorities.

Two major publications have followed that workshop: "Assessing the Public Health Threat Associated with Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis: Report of a Workshop" and "Cryptosporidium and Water: A Public Health Handbook". At the state level, prior to promulgation of the ICR, a Cryptosporidiosis Task Force was formed in February 1995 and the following Cryptosporidiosis Action Plan for Maryland was formulated in order to protect the health of Maryland citizens.

At the state level, prior to promulgation of the ICR, a Cryptosporidiosis Task Force was formed in February 1995 and the following Cryptosporidiosis Action Plan for Maryland was formulated in order to protect the health of Maryland citizens.

Maryland Cryptosporidiosis Task Force:

The Maryland Cryptosporidiosis Task Force convenes to define and monitor the progress of the Cryptosporidiosis Action Plan and to review new information regarding cryptosporidiosis and public health protection. Members include representatives from the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) Office of Office of Epidemiology and Disease Control Programs (EDCP) and the AIDS Administration, Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE), Health Education Resources Organization (HERO), the Chesapeake Section of the American Water Works Association (AWWA), and public and private surface water utility companies in Maryland

Goals of the Cryptosporidiosis Action Plan for Maryland:

  • to prevent waterborne cryptosporidiosis;
  • to educate water service company employees, health departments, health care providers, the public, and the immunosuppressed population about cryptosporidiosis; and
  • to outline situations where "boil water" orders should be issued and conditions under which such an order should be rescinded.
Plan of Action in Maryland

I. Prevention:

Protecting Public Drinking Water Attachment 5 provides some general information on public drinking water supplies in Maryland.

A. Ground Water Protection

Wellhead Protection concepts form the basis of various preventive approaches to maximize the safety of public water wells in Maryland. Regulatory standards begin with statewide application of well construction to ensure the integrity of the supply (Code of Maryland Regulations [COMAR] 26.04.04). An important preventive measure includes determining if a well is under direct influence (UDI) of surface water (COMAR 26.04.01).

The UDI wells are identified using geological review and application of various techniques such as dye studies, and using a special sampling protocol. Then, corrective measures such as remediation of sink holes and filtration of groundwater are applied to ensure that the water supplied is free from microbial contamination.

B. Surface Water Protection

Studies have shown that Cryptosporidium is common in surface waters throughout the United States. As a result, occasional presence of oocysts in Maryland's surface water should be expected. Various preventive approaches have been used in Maryland to maximize the safety of drinking water and to prevent cryptosporidiosis.

The first preventive approach is pollution prevention at the source. In Maryland, there are major pollution prevention activities at the watershed level. These activities are a combination of various program efforts such as Maryland Agricultural Cost Share (MACS) funding, National Pollutant Elimination Discharge System (NPDES) program, and the Maryland Tributary Strategies. While the focus of these efforts is to reduce the load of nutrients entering the Chesapeake Bay, they also reduce the load of pathogenic microorganisms going into rivers in Maryland.

In addition, as a result of the Safe Drinking Water Amendment passed in August 1996, MDE's Public Drinking Water Program has initiated a new coordinating effort, through technical and financial assistance, to maximize watershed protection practices of each surface water supplier. MDE's Public Drinking Water Program is also beginning a study on the variability of Cryptosporidium in drinking water intakes on the Potomac River. The study will also collect data on Cryptosporidium levels in wastewater discharges and the significance of their contribution to levels measured at intakes.

Another preventive approach is targeted toward water treatment plants to ensure that reliable and effective treatment in the plant can be maintained continuously. This approach involves performance evaluation of water treatment plants through
  • routine sanitary inspections;
  • design review of the water treatment facilities prior to construction;
  • technical assistance to the plant's staff;
  • review of various compliance monitoring, particularly microbial monitoring and monthly operating reports of the plants as required by the Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR); and
  • operator training and certification program.

In addition to the above, Comprehensive Performance Evaluations (CPEs), are conducted by MDE to evaluate filtration plants' performance and determine factors that limit performance. CPEs and follow up improvements are important tools for optimizing plant performance. Maryland is one of a few states that conducts CPEs for its surface water treatment plants. Attachment 6 shows Maryland surface water treatment plant intake locations.

C. Distribution System Protection

To prevent post-treatment contamination of water, the integrity of the distribution system must be maintained continuously. Various preventive measures such as routine maintenance, repair of distribution system components, and cross connection control programs should be used to achieve this goal.

D. Routine Testing of Water

Maryland regulations require the routine testing of public water systems for many parameters, including turbidity and coliform bacteria (COMAR 26.04.1). Turbidity, which is measured many times a day in surface water treatment plants, is a measure of particulate matter in water and is an indicator of the effectiveness of water treatment processes that remove pathogens such as Cryptosporidium. Coliform bacteria are indicator organisms; their presence in water indicates the possibility of contamination with pathogens. The presence of coliform bacteria could be a result of problems with ineffective water treatment or lack of integrity of the distribution system

Under the ICR, two surface water systems in Maryland are required to test for several microbial contaminants including Cryptosporidium. Currently, there is no other regulatory requirement for routine Cryptosporidium testing of water systems in Maryland. II.

Public Health Response and Risk Communication

To educate public health officials, water utility officials, health-care providers, immunosuppressed populations, and the general public about Cryptosporidium and drinking water, various activities have been conducted in Maryland.

Click here to view pages that summarize these activities.

III. Routine Surveillance and Epidemiological Methods

The CDC work group suggested seven approaches to surveillance, the following four of which are relevant to Maryland:

  • make cryptosporidiosis a reportable condition and monitor laboratory data for Cryptosporidium;
  • monitor sales of antidiarrheal medications;
  • monitor the incidence of diarrhea in nursing homes; and
  • make immediate epidemiological assistance available when necessary.

A. Make cryptosporidiosis a reportable condition in Maryland, monitor laboratory data, and monitor cryptosporidiosis among AIDS cases.

Effective October 1, 1996, Cryptosporidium was added to the list of agents reportable by laboratories in Maryland under Health-General Section 18-205, Code Annotated. EDCP will coordinate with the surveillance program of the AIDS Administration to obtain ongoing data on numbers of cases of cryptosporidiosis among AIDS patients reported. Increases will be evaluated to determine possible sources.

B. Establish pilot surveillance for sales of anti-diarrheal medication.

Since early 1995, Maryland has conducted surveillance for the sale of anti-diarrheal medications in cooperation with one large pharmacy chain. Total unit sales of three popular anti-diarrheal products by store location are reported weekly to EDCP. By monitoring sales of antidiarrheal products, we hope to determine the baseline normal volume of sales in a non-outbreak situation, and recognize any increases in sales which may be the result of a cryptosporidiosis outbreak. Significant increases in total unit sales compared to baseline, could result in various action steps including:

  • Surveys of affected communities to determine prevalence of gastroenteritis, symptoms, duration, and diagnosis;
  • Active surveillance for gastroenteritis cases in affected communities through emergency rooms, hospitals, nursing homes, and physician offices; and
  • Heightened surveillance for Cryptosporidium infection through emergency room testing of patients with diarrhea for Cryptosporidium.

C. Monitor the incidence of diarrhea in nursing homes.

At this time, outbreaks are reportable (COMAR 10.06.01) in Maryland including diarrhea outbreaks from long term care facilities. Long term care facilities are aware of the reporting requirements and each year EDCP receives approximately 30 to 60 reports of diarrhea outbreaks in these facilities.

The Outbreak Division of EDCP will maintain surveillance for diarrhea outbreaks and will maintain a high index of suspicion for outbreaks of diarrhea where the agent is not known, and the duration of illness exceeds that expected for viral gastroenteritis. The Outbreak Division will report cryptosporidiosis cases or outbreaks in long term care facilities to the LHD (if not previously known to the LHD), and to the MDE. Cases will be investigated (See Attachment 9A and 9B). MDE will coordinate actions with the local water utility.

Pilot projects may be considered in nursing homes with good data collection or in communities where water quality may be questioned to establish ongoing diarrhea surveillance and to determine causative agents.

D. Make immediate epidemiological assistance available.

The Outbreak Division of EDCP will work closely with MDE, DHMH AIDS Administration, and DHMH Licensing and Certification Program when any situation is identified where there may be questions of water quality or reports of gastroenteritis confirmed or suspected to be cryptosporidiosis.

IV. Prevention in Immunocompromised Individuals

Recommendations: On June 16, 1995 the EPA and the CDC released a joint statement concerning recommendations for people with severely weakened immune systems (Attachment 4). The Maryland Cryptosporidiosis Task Force accepts these recommendations. The following summarizes that statement:

  • Current EPA drinking water safety standards were not explicitly designed to assure the removal or killing of Cryptosporidium. While the magnitude of risk for acquiring cryptosporidiosis by drinking municipally treated water in the non-outbreak setting is presently unknown, the risk is not zero.
  • Because people with severely weakened immune systems are likely to have more severe and more persistent symptoms from Cryptosporidium infection than healthy individuals, immunocompromised individuals may want to take extra measures to avoid waterborne cryptosporidiosis. These extra precautions include boiling drinking water for one minute, using certain drinking water filters, or using certain bottled waters.
  • Boiling water is the most effective approach for killing Cryptosporidium.
  • Only point-of-use filters that remove particles one micrometer or less in diameter should be considered. Even with that, individuals should follow the manufacturer's instructions for filter use and regular replacement to assure Cryptosporidium removal (see Attachment 3).
  • Many, but not all, brands of bottled water may provide a reasonable alternative to boiling tap water. Individuals should carefully read the label and not presume that all bottled waters are absolutely free of Cryptosporidium. Any bottled water treated by distillation or reverse osmosis before bottling assures Cryptosporidium removal (see Attachment 3).
V. Emergency Response: Guidance for Testing Water and for Issuing and Rescinding Boil Water Orders when Waterborne Pathogens are Suspected
  • Emergency response may be necessary in one of two situations:
  • when problems of increased gastroenteritis known or suspected of being waterborne are reported to the MDE, the LHD or DHMH; or when water quality is known or suspected to present a risk to public health.

This guidance is intended for use by Maryland drinking water program staff and water utilities in making critical decisions about the use of boil water orders (BWO) for protecting the public from waterborne pathogens.

Decisions about BWOs must frequently be made within short time periods and with incomplete or inconclusive information. Professional judgment by knowledgeable regulatory, water utility, and public health officials is required. Both MDE and DHMH have emergency coverage and can be reached at the following telephone numbers:

  • MDE: 410-243-8700, 410-631-3937, or 410-631-4409
  • DHMH: 410-795-2100 (A state emergency operator at Springfield Hospital Center)
  • 410-678-8143 (DHMH Duty Officer)

A. Testing Water in Emergency Situations

Environmental Article section 9-406 of the Annotated Code of Maryland gives the Secretary, MDE broad-ranging powers to take any necessary action, including testing of water, to ensure a safe drinking water under emergency circumstances.

Laboratories capable of Cryptosporidium analysis are listed in Attachment 7. Under the ICR all samples for Cryptosporidium and Giardia must be analyzed by laboratories that meet stringent EPA criteria established for ICR purposes. EPA is occasionally revising the list of these approved laboratories, the most updated of which can be obtained through the Safe Drinking Water Hotline at (800) 426-4791. Water sampling techniques are provided in Attachment 8. More information on various testing methods for Cryptosporidium can be found in "Cryptosporidium and Water: A Public Health Handbook"

B. Issuing Boil Water Orders (BWO)

When making a decision on whether to issue a Boil Water Order (BWO): 1. Water utility and regulatory officials should determine whether any of the following circumstances exist:
    a. An acute violation of total coliform rule (TCR) or a violation of the SWTR (surface water treatment rule) turbidity standard;

    b. A non acute violation of the TCR (e.g., main break, cross connection);

    c. Positive test results for pathogens in finished water (e.g., Cryptosporidium, Giardia, Salmonella, or Shigella)*;

    d. Failure of or significant interruption in key water treatment process(es)/ monitoring (e.g., turbidity spikes of increases particle counts, mechanical or equipment failure, or persistent monitoring deficiencies); or

    e. Evidence of a disease outbreak of gastroenteritis where drinking water has been implicated as a potential source of the organism.

    f. A natural disaster that may adversely affect water quality (e.g., flood, hurricane, earthquake). * When evaluating positive test results for pathogens, consider:

    1. the approval status and experience of the laboratory with environmental samples,
    2. the appropriateness of sample collection and test methods for water,
    3. the inherent limitations in the test methods.
    4. For Cryptosporidium, negative results do not necessarily indicate the absence of organisms and positive results do not necessarily provide an accurate assessment of the number of organisms present, nor of their infectivity or viability.
    5. The time between collection of the sample and the availability of results. For example, a BWO may not necessarily be advisable if a positive test result was associated with a sample that was collected a month ago versus a few days ago.

2. Water utility and regulatory officials should determine whether any of the following challenges to source water quality, treatment effectiveness, or distribution system integrity exist:

    a. Source Water Quality

    The vulnerability of the source to contamination. Source waters should be considered vulnerable if they have access to cattle or dairy operations, sewage or sanitary discharges, or heavy recreational use.
        1. The results of previous monitoring for pathogens in source water. Source waters should be considered less vulnerable if adequate routine monitoring for pathogens or their indicators (fecal coliforms) have shown consistently negative results.
        2. The potential changes that affect source water quality. Source water quality will be adversely affected by sewage or manure spills, runoff events, turn over events, destratification of a reservoir, or other circumstances that cause a deterioration in raw water quality such as recent heavy or persistent rainfall, floods, or wind.

    b. Treatment effectiveness

        1. Plant optimization for pathogen removal. An optimized plant is capable of producing a high quality finished water on a continuous basis regardless of changes in raw water conditions. Such a plant would be unlikely to pass significant numbers of pathogens into the water distribution system. An optimized plant should have implemented an ongoing plan for treatment optimization such as offered by EPA or the AWWA.
        2. Treatment upset or interruption. Whether considered to be optimized or not, failure or interruption of key treatment processes can occur. Coagulation, flocculation, sedimentation, filtration, disinfection or other individual water treatment processes are all critical to remove pathogens. Mechanical difficulties or operational deficiencies can cause plant upsets.
        3. Finished water quality. Turbidity levels and changes, particle counts, and disinfection levels and residuals should be evaluated.

c. Distribution system integrity

The following should be evaluated:

  • presence of pathogens or indicator organisms;
  • disruption to the distribution system such as low pressure,
  • main breaks, or cross connections;
  • recent construction that might interrupt water flow;
  • stagnant water;
  • disinfection residual;
  • adequacy of the flushing program;
  • a poor recent sanitary survey;
  • age of the system.
C. Rescinding a BWO Officials should rescind a BWO when the following criteria are met: Source water quality has improved: criteria include turbidity levels, fecal coliform counts, cessation of storm events.
    1. Treatment is effective and treatment deficiency(ies) has(have) been corrected.
    2. Finished water quality has improved: Total coliform, fecal coliform, and E. coli counts are negative; turbidity is low with no spikes; successive pathogen monitoring tests show results below level of concern; sufficient finished water displacement has occurred in the distribution system to eliminate water that was or might have been contaminated. If the BWO was issued because of detection of a pathogen, then the analytical method(s) and its inadequacies must be considered when rescinding a BWO.
    3. Evidence that the incidence of disease has returned to normal. Due to long incubation periods and secondary spread of some pathogens, new cases may continue to occur after the period of contamination has ceased.
References
  1. Rose JB. Occurrence and significance of Cryptosporidium in water. Journal of the American Water Works Association 1988;80:53-8.
  2. Rose JB, Gerba CP, Jakubowski W. Survey of potable water supplies for Cryptosporidium and Giardia. Environmental Science and Technology 1991;25:1393-400.
  3. LeChevallier MW, Norton WD, Lee RG. Occurrence of Giardia and Cryptosporidium spp. in surface water supplies. Appl Environ Microbiol 1991;57:2610-6.
  4. LeChevallier MW, Norton WD, Lee RG. Giardia and Cryptosporidium spp. in filtered drinking water supplies. Appl Environ Microbiol 1991;57:2617-21.
  5. LeChevallier MW, Moser RH. Giardia and Cryptosporidium in raw and finished water. Journal of the American Water Works Association 1995;87:54-68.
  6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Assessing the public health threat associated with waterborne cryptosporidiosis: report of a workshop. MMWR 1995;44(No. RR-6).
  7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Assessing the public health threat associated with waterborne cryptosporidiosis: report of a workshop. MMWR 1995;44(No.RR-6).
  8. Cryptosporidium and Water: A Public Health Handbook. Atlanta, Georgia: Working group on Waterborne Cryptosporidiosis. 1997
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